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Abstract
Vertical pay dispersion (VPD), a hierarchical pay structure used to motivate 
employees, has traditionally been studied separately from high-performance 
work systems (HPWSs). As a component of HPWSs, incentive-based com-
pensation schemes focus on employee- or team-level incentives. However, 
the influence of the simultaneous utilization of VPD and HPWS on perfor-
mance remains understudied. This study addresses the question of whether 
these approaches to managing human capital serve as complements or sub-
stitutes to one another. VPD and HPWS are argued to substitute for one an-
other with respect to motivation- and skill-enhancing practices. The oppo-
site notion is true in regard to opportunity-enhancing HPWSs, which serve 
to amplify the effectiveness of VPD. In a multisource, longitudinal sample of 
South Korean firms, the hypothesized predictions are supported. 
Keywords: contingency theory, high-performance work systems, strategic 
HRM, tournament theory, vertical pay dispersion 
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1   Introduction 
Pay dispersion refers to the pattern of pay differential across and 
within different levels of the organizational hierarchy (Bloom, 1999; 
Bloom & Michel, 2002; Messersmith, Guthrie, Ji, & Lee, 2011; Milkovich 
& Newman, 2005). Vertical pay dispersion, in particular, focuses on the 
disparity in pay across different levels in the organization (Cowherd & 
Levine, 1992; Kepes, Delery, & Gupta, 2009). Vertically dispersed pay 
structures have received significant criticism in the literature for cre-
ating a culture of competition, feelings of relative deprivation (Crosby, 
1976), and concern that they suppress teamwork and collaboration 
(Akerlof & Yellen, 1988; Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005; Levine, 1991; 
Pfeffer & Langton, 1993). However, VPD also provides tournament-
type payoffs, and the efficacy of such systems is broadly supported in 
labor economics (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). In fact, VPD is a viable incen-
tive tool among many firms across multiple sectors and remains an ef-
ficacious tool to seek and allocate talent by facilitating sorting among 
employees (Gerhart & Fang, 2014). As such, vertically dispersed pay 
structures remain the modal system in many industries and organi-
zations (Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook & Gangloff, 2014; Conyon, Peck, & 
Sadler, 2001; Eriksson, 1999). 
In approaching the topic of VPD, we adopt the view espoused by 
Shaw (2014) in noting “the legitimacy and justifiability of pay disper-
sion” (p. 534). Such a view acknowledges that pay dispersion is nei-
ther universally beneficial nor detrimental, but that the effect of dis-
persed pay structures is contingent on a host of internal and external 
factors. Therefore, while the theorized organizational benefits of VPD 
are contingent upon proper implementation, they are possible given 
proper alignment with other system characteristics (Shaw, 2014; Trevor, 
Reilly, & Gerhart, 2012). 
As firm-level practices, both VPD and HPWSs aim to increase em-
ployee ability and motivation, ultimately in an attempt to improve 
firm performance. HPWSs also aim to enhance the ability and motiva-
tion of human capital while unlocking opportunities for employees to 
demonstrate their talent (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, & Kalleberg, 2000; 
Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, 2012). HPWSs include a complete menu of 
human resource practices ranging from extensive recruitment and 
selective staffing to intensive training and development programs, 
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performance evaluation, merit-based pay, and employee participation 
programs (Huselid, 1995; Takeuchi, Lepak, Wang, & Takeuchi, 2007). 
Therefore, HPWSs represent an integrated approach to acquiring and 
managing human capital, while VPD focuses on building a promotion 
and compensation structure that serves to signal, sort, and incentiv-
ize employees, apart from other HRM elements. 
This raises a natural question regarding the interplay between 
these two sets of practices and whether they enhance or detract from 
one another. Although the effects of VPD on performance are mixed 
and widely debated, we ask whether HR practices may complement 
or hinder the efficacy of VPD in influencing firm performance. Both 
VPD and HPWS aim to improve the human capital available to the 
firm. VPD focuses on building hierarchical pay structures with strong 
incentives for individuals to “compete” for promotions up the orga-
nizational ladder, where the gap between pay levels increases dis-
proportionately with each successive promotion. The logic suggests 
that steep corporate tournaments attract bright and talented employ-
ees who are then motivated to apply their talent in order to receive 
substantial rewards as they move up the corporate ladder (Lazear & 
Rosen, 1981). Hierarchical pay structures are also viewed as a tool to 
efficiently allocate risk. As individuals rise in the hierarchy, they face 
greater risk and their compensation is generally more variable. This 
allows the organization to shift risk to employees, while also allocat-
ing significant rewards to those at the top of the hierarchy who bear 
the greatest risk (Nalbantian, Guzzo, Kieffer, & Doherty, 2003). 
Bridging the two streams of literature—VPD and HPWSs—we build 
upon the growing work in both areas to better understand the rela-
tionship between vertically dispersed pay structures and HPWSs. Spe-
cifically, we address the theoretical mechanisms through which both 
VPD and HPWSs operate to affect performance to determine if VPD 
and HPWSs complement one another or substitute for one another. 
We specifically note the underlying differences in VPD and HPWS, as 
VPD theoretically injects competition within the firm, while HPWSs are 
espoused to produce collaboration. We further discuss the redundan-
cies that may be created when simultaneously utilizing VPD and HP-
WSs. By invoking two systems to achieve one result, the organization 
may be creating cost inefficiencies that place it at a competitive dis-
advantage. We highlight the tension between these two forces both 
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theoretically and empirically. Further, the system of high-performance 
work practices is decomposed to test the interactive effects of VPD 
and skill-, motivation-, and opportunity-enhancing HPWSs on the 
above-mentioned performance variables. This is an important area 
of inquiry, as many organizations simultaneously leverage hierarchi-
cal pay structures and HPWSs. Determining whether this results in an 
optimal combination for firm performance is a question of theoreti-
cal and practical significance. 
This article contributes to the management literature in a number 
of ways. Most notably, it builds upon strategic HR research focusing 
on the configurational and contingent nature of management prac-
tice implementation (Delery & Doty, 1996; Huselid & Becker, 2010; 
Lepak & Shaw, 2008). While both VPD and HPWSs have been dem-
onstrated to offer beneficial organizational outcomes, they may not 
necessarily work well together to produce desired behavioral effects. 
Therefore, the article addresses a practically meaningful question in 
attempting to understand the challenges associated with integrating 
HPWSs into vertically dispersed pay structures. Addressing this ten-
sion within the system and untangling the motivational properties of 
each add value to the literature and guidance to practice. While exist-
ing work has examined the influence of pay dispersion in combination 
with other characteristics of the compensation system (Shaw, Gupta, 
& Delery, 2002), to our knowledge no study to date has attempted 
to disentangle the effects of pay structure choices as combined with 
a “typical” HPWS. The results have clear policy implications for firms 
seeking to assess gains from a hierarchically dispersed pay structure 
and the implementation of other skill-, motivation-, and opportunity-
enhancing HR practices. 
Second, we examine the more nuanced relationships between HP-
WSs and VPD by investigating the manner in which VPD interacts with 
the three subsystems of HPWSs related to skill, motivation, and op-
portunity enhancement. This provides a more contextualized view of 
the relationship between VPD and the key levers and mechanisms 
within the HPWS. The results yield important information for both 
scholarship and practice as it relates to the implementation of pay 
structures and other management practices to achieve higher perfor-
mance. In doing so, the study also addresses a need for developing 
a deeper understanding of the way in which individual HR practices 
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interact within the overall system of practices (Lepak & Shaw, 2008) 
and examines connections between micro and macro models in the 
field of HRM (Wright & Boswell, 2002). In particular, while the orga-
nizational sciences have begun to explore the micro-foundations of 
competitive advantage (i.e., Abell, Felin, & Foss, 2008; Coff & Kryscyn-
ski, 2011), we add to this discussion by looking at the “macrofounda-
tions” of system alignment and fit. 
Third, the article tests the propositions using a large, multiyear, 
multisource sample of firms across multiple industries in South Korea. 
The robustness of the data allows for meaningful comparisons across 
organizations and chronological spacing between the measurement 
of the independent variables and the dependent variables. While not 
conclusive, the evidence provided herein offers guidance to scholars 
and practitioners alike. 
2   Attracting and Motivating Human Capital: VPD and HPWS 
At the root, both work on HPWSs and VPD have emphasized the mo-
tivational elements of such practices. Pay dispersion research has typ-
ically been built on the theoretical framework of tournament theory. 
Tournament theory is a robust theoretical framework (see Connelly 
et al., 2014, for a recent review) with an underlying thesis pointing to 
the motivational value of disproportionate pay differences in relation 
to peers. As such, tournament theory emphasizes the value of steep 
pay hierarchies produced through contests in which organizational 
actors compete for promotion and rewards (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). 
This theory views all promotions within the organization as contests 
in which each individual employee is competing with others at their 
same level for promotion to the next rung of the corporate ladder. As 
one moves up the ladder, rewards become disproportionately greater, 
such that the pay increase from Level 2 to Level 3 is greater than from 
Level 1 to Level 2, and so on. 
Tournament-type pay structures lead to both sorting and incentive 
effects (Conyon et al., 2001; Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Sorting effects re-
fer to the ability of the firm to attract the best talent possible to the 
organization by offering a tournament structure of disproportionately 
increasing rewards. Such models argue that the best employees are 
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attracted to firms with steep pay structures. Sorting effects also allow 
organizations to let go of less valuable human capital as employees 
with lower chances of advancing in the tournament leave the firm. The 
incentive effect refers to the motivation that all employees enjoy as 
they attempt to move up the rungs of the hierarchy (Becker & Huselid, 
1992). Tournament theory acknowledges that although the organiza-
tion is likely paying those at the top of the hierarchy more than their 
marginal contribution to the firm, this effect is more than balanced 
by the fact that the organization is receiving contributions from lower 
level employees that exceed their cost. As aptly put by Lazear (1989, 
p. 226), “The salary of the vice president acts not so much as moti-
vation for the vice president as it does as motivation for the assistant 
vice presidents.” 
In addition, tournament-based pay structures are also viewed as an 
efficient mechanism to allocate risk within the organization (Nalban-
tian et al., 2004). As employees are promoted through the hierarchy, 
they generally have greater levels of their compensation put at risk 
through incentive-based pay or equity-based pay. Those at the top 
tolerate this risk because of the disproportionate increase in the ex-
pected value of the reward. Similarly, those at lower rungs often have 
less compensation placed at risk, but also have lower potential pay-
outs. As such, risk is shifted from the organization to employees more 
efficiently through tournament-based structures to ensure that those 
at the top are motivated to achieve firm-level objectives, which will 
likely boost their overall compensation package. This is further under-
scored when relative performance (i.e., performance compared to in-
dustry peers) is measured rather than absolute performance, as sys-
temic exogenous risk is shifted to shareholders (or owners) and away 
from employees (Haig, Nalbantian, & Zheng, 2004). 
VPD, therefore, is viewed as an important tool for motivating em-
ployees across the organizational hierarchy to ultimately improve the 
financial returns of the firm and to more efficiently allocate risk. Ce-
teris paribus, the larger the spread between levels, the greater the 
motivation for lower level employees to compete for promotions 
in an effort to earn the commensurate financial rewards. This effect 
has largely been supported in the literature on tournament theory, 
both within and outside of the field of management (Connelly et al., 
2014). In fact, a host of studies within this stream of research have 
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demonstrated that greater levels of vertical pay dispersion are advan-
tageous to generating financial returns for the organization (Brown, 
Sturman, & Simmering, 2003; Ding, Akhtar, & Ge, 2009; Garrett & Go-
palakrishna, 2010; Hibbs & Locking, 2000; Kalra & Shi, 2001; Lee, Lev, 
& Yao, 2008; Poujol & Tanner, 2010). 
Meanwhile, HPWSs have traditionally been defined as a constel-
lation of aligned practices aimed at enhancing the ability and moti-
vation of human resources, while also increasing the opportunities 
available to human resources to utilize their talent (Appelbaum et al., 
2000; Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, 2012). This ability, motivation, oppor-
tunity (AMO) framework is based on the notion of social exchange, 
in which human resources seek to match their contributions to the 
rewards that they receive (Blau, 1964). This literature has generally 
found empirical support for the notion that human resources who 
are selected via rigorous selection processes are trained adequately, 
provided with development opportunities, given a voice in the orga-
nization, and compensated based upon merit will respond with com-
mitment and engagement (Jackson, Schuler, & Rivero, 1989; Messer-
smith, Patel, Lepak, & Gould-Williams, 2011). Further, such systems 
build human and social capital within the firm, thereby leading to im-
proved firm performance (Becker & Huselid, 1998; Combs, Liu, Hall, 
& Ketchen, 2006; Huselid & Becker, 2010; Lepak & Snell, 1999). This 
literature base has generally found support linking the utilization of 
HPWSs in various forms to financial performance (e.g., Combs et al., 
2006; Delery & Shaw, 2001; Huselid, 1995; Wright, Gardner, Moyni-
han, & Allen, 2005). 
2.1   Assessing the Effects of Combining HPWS and VPD 
Given these different theoretical approaches to attracting, retaining, 
and motivating human capital, it is reasonable to ask how pay dis-
persion and HPWSs may interact with one another. We argue that 
HPWSs and VPD both work to motivate employees, but that the in-
clusion of HPWS in conjunction with VPD may not be optimal for 
boosting firm performance. The distinction between HPWSs and VPD 
lies in the underlying theories governing each system. HPWSs tend to 
be formulated on the basis of social exchange, providing individuals 
with rewards and advancement based on contributions and observed 
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performance. Utilizing a system of complementary HR practices is 
thought to produce greater levels of human capital in the firm and 
also to open avenues for employees to display greater discretionary 
effort (Bailey, 1993; Huselid, 1995; Takeuchi et al., 2007). Further, HP-
WSs tend to be modeled as commitment-based systems, which pro-
mote strong psychological ties that are created between the individ-
ual and the organization, such that individual and organizational goals 
are properly aligned, increasing effort and maximizing the value of hu-
man capital (Arthur, 1994; Lepak & Shaw, 2008). Therefore, HPWSs are 
largely built on a system of equity in which employees are provided 
with tools to enhance their skills and ability, while also being given 
opportunities to maximize their own human capital to the betterment 
of both the individual and the firm. Such systems tend to be based 
on a general sense of fairness and social exchange. If an employee, 
individually, performs well, he/she will earn commensurate rewards. 
As noted above, the benefit of implementing HPWs is generally 
based on building both human capital and social capital. The social 
capital aspects may be harmed by the inclusion of tournament struc-
tures that promote competition and detract from cooperation in in-
terdependent environments (Becker & Huselid, 1992). In some cases, 
competition may create a sense of unfairness relative to others in 
the organization that may lead to the deliberate attempt to under-
mine other team members (Fredrickson, Davis-Blake, & Sanders, 2010; 
Lazear, 1989). In many ways, the pay practices typically included in HP-
WSs are aligned with equity theory (Wallace & Fay, 1983), which pres-
ents a compensation model suggesting that individuals compare the 
pay they receive to others based on the ratio of inputs/rewards for 
each. When the ratio is similar, equity is thought to be present, even 
if significant differences exist in absolute compensation. 
VPD, on the other hand, is based on the logic of competition, 
where small differences in performance lead to significant differences 
in compensation and other rewards, all in an effort to optimize per-
formance (Becker & Huselid, 1992; Connelly et al., 2014; Fredrickson 
et al., 2010; Heyman, 2005; Main, O’Reilly, & Wade, 1993). VPD places 
the emphasis on relative performance rather than absolute perfor-
mance and sets up competitions across the organization. This means 
that employees are motivated to “win” by outperforming peers. Small 
increases in performance therefore lead to much greater rewards 
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(Connelly et al., 2014). In addition, VPD stands in contrast to equity-
based models by explicitly providing individuals at the top of the or-
ganizational hierarchy greater rewards than their inputs may warrant. 
As a result of these competing logics, we would expect that firms 
utilizing HPWSs and VPD simultaneously may see weakened firm fi-
nancial performance. Utilizing HPWSs is costly, as it requires signifi-
cant resource commitment and could be difficult to implement across 
all employee groups (Huselid & Becker, 2010), especially in smaller or 
newer firms (Way, 2002). As such, it is reasonable to expect that in-
cluding HPWSs and VPD may actually weaken performance because 
of the cost associated with full-scale HPWS implementation. While this 
cost increase is generally negated by the overall benefit of ability-, 
motivation-, and opportunity-enhancement, the competing forces of 
VPD and HPWS may partially cancel this effect. Therefore, the firm no 
longer reaps the full benefit of dispersed structures. 
In sum, the fundamental logic underscoring HPWSs and VPD as 
characteristics of an organizational system differs, possibly creating 
a suboptimal solution in which one aspect moves employees toward 
greater competition (VPD), while the other stresses commitment and 
collaboration (HPWS). While each is useful for incentivizing quality 
work, the attributes work across purposes, creating a suboptimal re-
sult when leveraged simultaneously. Therefore, we test the following: 
Hypothesis 1: HPWSs will negatively moderate the relationship 
between VPD and organizational performance, such that an in-
creased emphasis on HPWSs dilutes the effectiveness of VPD on 
firm performance. 
In addition to assessing the utilization of the entire set of prac-
tices, it is also important to examine the various components of the 
HPWS to determine the detrimental or complementary role that each 
may play in the relationship between VPD and firm performance. HP-
WSs represent a constellation of practices, some of which may oper-
ate well in conjunction with a vertically dispersed pay structure, while 
others operate across purposes, as noted above. To disentangle these 
effects, we follow Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer (2012) in examining the 
three subcomponents of the HPWSs: skill-, motivation-, and oppor-
tunity-enhancing practices. 
Messersmith  et  al .  in  Human Resources  Management ,  2017      10
Skill-enhancing practices tend to be focused on building the 
knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) of human capital. Typically, prac-
tices related to selective staffing and training have been included in 
measures of skill-enhancing HPWSs (Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, 2012). 
Selective staffing involves building extensive recruitment programs to 
attract the best talent while also setting up a series of employment 
tests to determine the candidate with the best KSA profile to per-
form a given job. Training, notably, involves identifying deficiencies 
in the selected candidates’ KSAs and providing learning and knowl-
edge-acquisition activities in order to ready the individual to perform 
the tasks, duties, and responsibilities of the job. Both selective staff-
ing and intensive training are costly approaches to acquiring and se-
lecting human capital. Each requires multiple steps, careful analysis, 
and trained evaluators to make decisions. 
As noted, VPD builds in sorting effects, in which the best available 
talent is thought to seek after organizations with the steepest struc-
tures in order to compete for top “prizes” and higher levels of com-
pensation. A vertically dispersed pay structure may produce wage pre-
miums that can effectively eliminate, or at least reduce, the need for 
career advancement and internal promotion programs within the firm 
(Cappelli & Cascio, 1991). This arises as individuals are naturally incen-
tivized by the pay structure to seek ever increasing rewards, lessen-
ing the need for more formal career development programs, job lad-
dering, or other specific internal promotion policies. As Cappelli and 
Cascio (1991) note, the wage structure alone may be enough to cre-
ate the internal labor market, without having to create redundancies 
with other HR practices aimed at motivating career advancement and 
ensuring a consistent pool of human capital within the firm. As such, 
if the sorting effects of a dispersed pay structure are effective, then 
adding selective staffing and extensive training opportunities may 
actually increase the firm’s cost structure and dilute the benefits of 
VPD. We propose that combining skill-enhancing practices with VPD 
means that the organization is achieving suboptimal results, because 
of the increased costs associated with leveraging two sets of pro-
cesses aimed at delivering the same results. Rather, firms that are able 
to capture the sorting effects of VPD are able to conserve financial re-
sources by not investing as heavily in other skill-enhancing practices. 
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Hypothesis 2: Skill-enhancing HPWSs will negatively moderate 
the relationship between VPD and organizational performance, 
such that an increased emphasis on HPWS dilutes the effective-
ness of VPD on firm performance. 
Motivation-enhancing practices are those directly aimed at in-
creasing the discretionary effort of employees. Such practices tend to 
include utilizing performance evaluation, pay for performance plans, 
paying above-market wages, and providing extensive employee ben-
efits (Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, 2012). The relationship between VPD 
and HPWSs is most closely connected at the juncture of rewards and 
promotion, which are also core elements of tournament theory. As 
such, the relationship is likely to be overlapping and highly contextu-
alized. Many pay systems common to HPWS will likely accentuate the 
effectiveness of HPWS. For instance, individual merit-based pay plans 
will likely enhance the effectiveness of VPD. Indeed, it is through the 
provisions of the merit-based system that the hierarchy is likely es-
tablished. This will be further accentuated by individual bonus sys-
tems that are closely pegged to base salary. As such, individual reward 
schemes will likely operate to reinforce the effects of the hierarchical 
pay structure.1 
However, many of the other motivation-enhancing practices com-
mon to HPWSs will likely align orthogonally with VPD. As noted above, 
tournament theory postulates that a firm can more efficiently moti-
vate employees by setting up tournaments in which those at the top 
are paid disproportionate rewards, thereby inducing those at lower 
levels to compete for promotion and advancement. Such pay struc-
tures are viewed as economically efficient because a collective group 
of employees is being motivated via the pay of a few, rather than mo-
tivating on an individual basis (Connelly et al., 2014). As discussed 
previously, another notable strength of such systems is the ability to 
distribute risk when absolute measures of individual ability are diffi-
cult to obtain. 
This stands in opposition to motivation-enhancing HPWSs, which 
often include provisions for pay-for-performance plans and above-
market pay level as basic staples (Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, 2012). The 
idea behind pay-for-performance is that individuals are motivated 
to produce more if they are paid directly based on how much they 
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produce for the organization (Deckop, Mangel, & Cirka, 1999; Oliver 
& Anderson, 1995). The literature has generally found this link to hold 
in organizations (Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1988; Rynes, Gerhart, 
& Parks, 2005); however, it creates greater expense for the firm. Rather 
than paying only a handful of organizational actors above their mar-
ginal contribution to the firm, the firm pays all employees in accor-
dance with the firm’s pay policy. While dispersed pay structures that 
are based on pay-for-performance tend to promote a sense of equity 
among employees and have been demonstrated to lead to better in-
dividual performance (Shaw et al., 2002), the use of both practices si-
multaneously will likely increase the firm’s cost structure and dimin-
ish the effectiveness of VPD. 
Similarly, though paying above-market wages or providing above-
market benefits is likely to attract high-quality human capital, it is pos-
sible that this human capital would have been motivated to join the 
firm at (or possibly below) market wages at the entry level, with the 
promise of being able to compete for significantly higher rewards with 
advancement in the firm. As noted above, VPD focuses on the relative 
nature of compensation, rather than absolute compensation. There-
fore, the emphasis tends to be placed on internal comparisons within 
the tournament rather than external market comparisons. This em-
phasis on competition stands at odds with information-sharing prac-
tices and participation mechanisms aimed at producing collaboration 
through the HPWS. Employees are essentially being pulled in two sep-
arate directions by the various elements of the control system, lead-
ing to suboptimal results. 
Other elements of traditional models of motivation-enhancing HP-
WSs are likely to work against the vertical pay structure, as well. For 
instance, pay plans that are based on profit sharing, team-based pay, 
or gainsharing all operate on a basis of collaboration. These programs 
enhance employee wages to the extent that the team, department, or 
firm does well financially. Such programs can be useful under the right 
context in motivating human capital to achieve high levels of per-
formance, particularly through shared efforts. However, if these pro-
grams are implemented in conjunction with vertical pay dispersion, 
the two attributes may work against each other. If some parties re-
ceive a larger share of the pie when profits or gains are shared, it may 
be perceived as unfair by those lower in the hierarchy. This may lead 
to a sense of inequity that undermines the intended collaboration of 
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the HPWS. Similarly, if rewards are shared with all individuals in the 
organization, it may contribute to a “free rider” effect, in which poor 
performers receive pay increases for efforts they have not given. This 
will likely be a disincentive to high performers, leading them to sort 
out of the organization. 
Further, it may be more economically efficient to offer a vertically 
dispersed pay structure rather than both offering such a structure and 
paying above market wages or providing above-market benefits. By 
paying all employees significantly above the market rate, rather than 
paying only those who “win” the corporate tournament higher rates, 
the firm is increasing its overall cost structure. By combining high av-
erage wages with higher maximum wages, the firm places itself at a 
competitive disadvantage relative to peers emphasizing only one or 
the other. The results are a less efficient control system. This leads to 
the following: 
Hypothesis 3: Motivation-enhancing HPWSs will negatively 
moderate the relationship between VPD and organizational per-
formance, such that an increased emphasis on HPWSs dilutes the 
effectiveness of VPD on firm performance. 
Opportunity-enhancing practices are employee suggestion and 
participation systems, job rotation, job autonomy, and communication 
programs (Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, 2012). As compared to motiva-
tion-enhancing and skill-enhancing HPWSs, we expect that opportu-
nity-enhancing HPWSs will actually make vertical pay structures more 
successful at improving firm performance. This is expected because 
HPWSs enhance the number of opportunities available to employees 
who are already incentivized to perform at a high level by the vertical 
pay structure. The net effect is an increase in performance because 
highly motivated workers are matched with opportunities. 
A key tenet of tournament theory is that tournaments are success-
ful at motivating performance only if contestants feel as if their in-
vestment of effort will directly influence their probability of advanc-
ing in the tournament (Connelly et al., 2014). Similar to the predictions 
of expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), individuals will put forth opti-
mal effort only if they believe that the increased effort will directly en-
hance their chance of “winning” the promotion. Therefore, we expect 
that opportunity-enhancing HPWSs, which include such practices as 
Messersmith  et  al .  in  Human Resources  Management ,  2017      14
job autonomy, communication, and participation (Jiang, Lepak, Hu, 
& Baer, 2012) will work in concert with VPD by providing individu-
als with greater opportunities to display their skill relative to others 
in the firm. Without the opportunity to participate, those involved in 
corporate tournaments may feel frustrated and will be less likely to 
put forth the effort necessary to “win,” as they sense that winning is 
based on factors unrelated to job performance. 
Further, opportunity-enhancing HPWSs tend to focus more upon 
unlocking intrinsic motivation rather than building extrinsic motiva-
tion (Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, 2012; Ryan & Deci, 2000). As such, these 
practices are likely to work via different motivational cues than VPD, 
which can be more fully linked to extrinsic motivation (Connelly et al., 
2014; Twenge, Campbell, Hoffman, & Lance, 2010). Assuming a multi-
faceted view of motivation (Reiss & Havercamp, 1998), which includes 
elements of both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, providing oppor-
tunity enhancement with a VPD may result in an optimal solution for 
generating greater individual and organizational performance. This 
leads to the following prediction: 
Hypothesis 4: Opportunity-enhancing HPWSs positively mod-
erate the relationship between VPD and organizational perfor-
mance such that an increased emphasis on HPWSs enhances the 
effectiveness of VPD on firm performance. 
In sum, we expect that HPWSs overall will undermine the effective-
ness of vertical pay dispersion. We expect this to also hold in regard to 
skill-enhancing and motivation-enhancing practices, but expect that 
opportunity-enhancing practices will positively moderate the relation-
ship. These relationships are summarized in Figure 1. 
3   METHOD 
3.1   Sample 
To test the proposed hypotheses, we analyze a panel data set of firms 
in South Korea. Four waves of panel surveys were biennially collected 
during 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011 by the Korea Research Institute for 
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Vocational Education and Training (KRIVET) in cooperation with the 
Ministry of Labor in South Korea. KRIVET created the initial sampling 
frame, which included all South Korean firms with more than 100 em-
ployees and for whom accounting performance data was available from 
the Korean Information Service. The initial sampling pool had 454, 467, 
473, and 500 firms in 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011, respectively. In each 
organization, both organizational-level surveys and employee-level sur-
veys were administered. Human resources managers and strategic plan-
ning managers rated organizational-level survey items. For the em-
ployee-level survey, 13,101 employees in 2005, 11,473 employees in 
2007, 10,019 employees in 2009, and 10,064 employees in 2011 were 
randomly selected at each wave from different hierarchical levels (e.g., 
rank-and-file employees, assistant managers, and executives) and di-
verse functional areas (e.g., marketing, finance, and management).2 
We combined the employee-level data with organizational-level 
data because some variables in our study are measured by aggregat-
ing individual employees’ responses. Additionally, as common method 
bias may influence the validity of findings (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, 
& Podsakoff, 2003), we merged the combined data set (organizational 
and individual data) with archival financial performance data available 
from the Korea Information Services. 
While the four-waves of panel data contain a total of 832 firms af-
ter dropping observations with missing data, for the present study we 
used firms from which more than five top managers participated in 
the survey. We used five top managers as the criterion based on past 
research (Connelly, Haynes, Tihanyi, Gamache, & Devers, 2016). Our 
final sample is a panel of 233 firms and 8,328 employees. This is an 
unbalanced panel data set that consists of 60 firms and 2,427 employ-
ees (on average 40.5 employees in each firm) in 2005, 54 firms and 
1,827 employees (on average 33.8 employees in each firm) in 2007, 58 
firms and 1,913 employees (on average 33.0 employees in each firm) 
in 2009, and 61 firms and 2,161 employees (on average 35.4 employ-
ees in each firm) in 2011. 
3.2   Measures 
All the predictors are measured at four time points, 2004, 2006, 2008, 
and 2010. 
Messersmith  et  al .  in  Human Resources  Management ,  2017      16
3.2.1   Independent variable: Vertical pay dispersion 
We followed Connelly et al. (2016)’s operationalization of VPD to 
measure vertical pay dispersion (VPD). Connelly et al. (2016) opera-
tionalized top management-to-worker pay dispersion as the average 
top management team (TMT) total compensation (numerator) divided 
by the average non-TMT employees’ compensation (denominator). In 
this study, we broadly defined top management as department heads 
and executives. We obtained the average TMT total compensation for 
each firm by averaging department heads’ and executives’ total com-
pensation for each firm (numerator). On average, our sample contains 
7.61 top managers from each firm. To obtain average non-TMT em-
ployees’ compensation (denominator), we first calculated the firm’s 
total labor expenses from each firm’s annual report; we summed the 
employees’ salary (including TMT), incentives, and allowances. From 
the total labor expenses, we subtracted the total compensation for 
the TMT, which was calculated by multiplying the average TMT total 
compensation and the number of TMT. The total labor expenses ex-
cluding TMT were then divided by the number of employees (i.e., av-
erage non-TMT employees’ compensation). We divided the average 
TMT total compensation (numerator) by the average non-TMT em-
ployees’ compensation (denominator) and standardized it to mea-
sure a firm’s VPD. 
3.2.2   Moderation variable: HPWS 
For the operationalization of HPWS index, we followed Shaw, Park, 
and Kim (2013) and measured selection ratio, training investment, pay 
level, benefit level, and communication. We measured the selection 
ratio by dividing the total number of new hires by the total number 
of applicants (Shaw, Delery, Jenkins, & Gupta, 1998). We measured 
training investment by dividing the total training expenses (for col-
lective inside- and outside-the-company trainings) by the number of 
full-time employees (Sung & Choi, 2014). Following Shaw et al. (2013), 
we measured benefit level as the average annual benefit level for full-
time employees. Pay level was similarly operationalized as the aver-
age annual salary level for full-time employees. To measure the com-
munication system, we averaged the three items used in Shaw et al. 
(2013) (α = 0.76 in 2005; α = 0.75 in 2007; α = 0.80 in 2009; α = 0.82 
in 2011). Example item includes “our company shares organization 
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information with all employees through managers or company-wide 
communication systems.” Employees assessed the three items using 
a 5-point Likert-type scale. We aggregated the communication scores 
to the organizational level; rwg were 0.91 in 2005, 0.92 in 2007, 0.91 in 
2009, and 0.91 in 2011. ICC(1) and ICC(2) were, respectively, 0.15 and 
0.87 in 2005, 0.17 and 0.87 in 2007, 0.19 and 0.88 in 2009, and 0.19 
and 0.89 in 2011. Overall, aggregation of employee responses at the 
firm level is supported. 
To measure motivation-enhancing and opportunity-enhancing HP-
WSs more broadly, we included performance evaluation, pay for per-
formance, employee suggestion, job rotation, job autonomy, and em-
ployee participation in decision making in our HPWS index. Human 
resource managers in each organization reported if the organization 
had completed employee evaluations; the balanced scorecard, com-
petency evaluation, multisource evaluation, and performance feed-
back (1 = yes, 0 = no). We averaged these four evaluation practices 
to create the performance evaluation measure. Pay for performance 
was measured in the same way. We averaged four dummy variables 
(1 = yes, 0 = no), which indicates the presence or absence of the fol-
lowing four pay-for-performance practices: team-based incentives, 
department-based incentives, gain sharing, and stock options. 
For employee suggestion programs, we used a dichotomous vari-
able that indicates whether employee suggestion systems had been 
administered in the organization. This was rated by human resource 
managers in each organization (1 = yes; 0 = no). We used a dummy 
variable that indicates the presence or absence of a job rotation prac-
tice in each organization. This was also rated by human resource man-
agers (1 = yes; 0 = no). We used aggregation of employees’ ratings 
for job autonomy and participation in decision making. Employees 
in each organization assessed the extent to which employees in their 
work teams actively participated in decision making and problem solv-
ing using a 5-point Likert-type scale. We aggregated these individ-
ual responses to produce a participation in decision making measure 
at the organizational level. We examined the appropriateness of ag-
gregation using such aggregation statistics as rwg (James, Demaree, 
& Wolf, 1993) and intraclass correlation [ICC(1) and ICC(2)]. rwg were 
0.83 in 2005, 0.84 in 2007, 0.83 in 2009, and 0.82 in 2011. ICC(1) and 
ICC(2) were, respectively, 0.02 and 0.14 in 2005, 0.11 and 0.50 in 2007, 
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0.21 and 0.68 in 2009, and 0.11 and 0.46 in 2011. These aggregation 
statistics indicate that there is a significant difference between orga-
nizations and high reliability among employees. Job autonomy was 
measured in the same way. Employees rated the extent to which they 
have job autonomy in doing their work using a 5-point Likert-type 
scale. We aggregated the job autonomy scores to the organizational 
level for our analysis. rwg were 0.79 in 2005, 0.74 in 2007, 0.77 in 2009, 
and 0.80 in 2011. ICC(1) and ICC(2) were, respectively, 0.03 and 0.23 
in 2005, 0.10 and 0.47 in 2007, 0.14 and 0.55 in 2009, and 0.18 and 
0.60 in 2011. These ICC statistics justify the aggregation. 
We utilized a formative measurement of the HPWS index based 
on the criteria outlined in MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Jarvis (2005). 
We utilize this approach for three specific reasons. First, the sum of 
HR practices defines manifestations of the HPWS rather than being 
defined by it. Second, different HR practices represent a unique as-
pect of the HPWS, and thus are not interchangeable. This suggests HR 
practices do not systematically co-vary. Third, in spite of some com-
monalities, each HR practice may have different/unique antecedents 
and outcomes (Jiang, Lepak, Han, Hong, Kim, & Winkler, 2012). Meet-
ing all the criteria, in this study, HR practices as indicators are viewed 
as combining to cause the latent construct, HPWS, rather than being 
caused by it (MacCallum & Browne, 1993). Therefore, the HPWS index 
is a formative measure. Reliability assessments such as coefficient al-
pha are not appropriate for a formative measure, as its indicators are 
not expected to co-vary (Bollen & Lennox, 1991; Diamantopoulos & 
Siguaw, 2006; MacKenzie et al., 2005). 
Following previous studies (e.g., Shaw, Dineen, Fang, & Vellella, 
2009; Wright et al., 2005), we standardized the 11 HR practices and 
created an additive index of HPWS. Additionally, we categorized the 
11 HR practices into three dimensions of HPWS to create skill-enhanc-
ing, motivation-enhancing, and opportunity-enhancing HPWSs based 
on the work by Jiang, Lepak, Hu, and Baer (2012).  
3.2.3   Dependent variable: Organizational performance 
For the dependent variable, we used four financial performance 
measures, which are widely used in the strategic management liter-
ature (e.g., Hoskisson, 1987; Roberts & Dowling, 2002): return on as-
sets (ROA), firm profitability, net income, and workforce productivity. 
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To establish better causal ordering of relationships, we included past 
organizational performance measured at T as a control variable. The 
past performance measures vary depending on the dependent vari-
ables used in the analysis model. For example, when ROA measured 
at T + 1 was used as a dependent variable, ROA at T was controlled. 
We measured ROA by dividing after-tax profit (or net profit) by 
total assets (Roberts & Dowling, (2002). Following Mehra (1996), we 
measured firm profitability as net profit per employee. Because of the 
skewness of the distribution, firm profitability was logged. Shapiro-
Wilk W statistic showed that the sampling distribution after the trans-
formation approached normality (W = .99, ns) (Royston, 1982; Shap-
iro & Wilk, 1965). We adopted a one-year lag into our performance 
measures to examine how predictors in year T influenced organiza-
tional performance in T + 1. 
In our robustness checks, we used an organization’s net income 
and workforce productivity as dependent variables. Workforce pro-
ductivity was measured as total sales per employee (Shaw et al., 2013). 
Workforce productivity was logged due to the skewed distribution. 
Shapiro-Wilk W statistic supported the transformation, indicating that 
the sampling distribution approached normality (W = .98, p < .01) 
(Royston, 1982; Shapiro & Wilk, 1965). Ratio measures as dependent 
variables may confound the estimated relationships with independent 
variables because independent variables may be associated with both 
the numerator and the denominator of the ratio measures (e.g., Bar-
nett & Salomon, 2012). Therefore, we complemented the above de-
pendent measures with an unscaled measure of organizational perfor-
mance. Following Barnett and Salomon (2012), we used net income as 
a non-ratio measure of organizational performance. Because the mea-
sure was skewed, we used the natural log of net income. The transfor-
mation was supported by the Shapiro-Wilk W statistic (W = .99, ns) 
(Royston, 1982; Shapiro & Wilk, 1965). 
3.2.4   Control variables 
We included several control variables that are relevant to our re-
search model. We controlled for organizational age (the number of 
years since the founding year) and size (log of the number of full 
time employees) as older and larger organizations are more likely 
to employ better developed HR practices than smaller organizations 
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(Guthrie, 2001). Organizational human capital is positively associated 
with both HPWSs and organizational performance (e.g., Jiang, Lepak, 
Hu, & Baer, 2012). Therefore, we controlled for the average employee 
educational level (Black & Lynch, 1996). We included a weighted av-
erage of organizational educational level (1 = less than high school 
diploma; 2 = two-year college degree; 3 = four-year college degree; 
4 = master’s degree; 5 = doctoral degree), in the analysis. 
We controlled for a firm’s strategic orientation in the industry be-
cause it may influence the implementation of HPWS as well as firm 
performance. The strategic planning manager in each organization 
rated the firm’s strategic orientation, whether it behaves most like a 
prospector, analyzer, or defender in the industry in each year (Miles & 
Snow, 1978). A detailed definition for each term was provided in the 
survey. With defender as a reference group, we created two dummies 
(prospector and analyzer) and included them in the analysis. 
Finally, we controlled for industry effects and year effects by in-
cluding industry dummies and year dummies. Measurement invari-
ance testing was also completed prior to analyzing the data as a 
prerequisite for correctly interpreting the results from a longitudinal 
sample (Finkel, 1995). We adapted the procedure suggested by Dia-
mantopoulos and Papadopoulos (2010); we used year as a grouping 
variable. The invariance tests confirmed that the HPWS index is struc-
tural, slope, and residual invariant across the 2005, 2007, 2009, and 
2011 panels. The results are not reported herein to conserve space 
but are available from the authors upon request. 
3.3   Analytical strategy 
The sampling frame includes organizations from which at least five 
TMT members participated in the survey. Although the necessity can 
be well justified, this may cause a sample selection problem because 
sample selection bias generally occurs when observations are not ran-
domly selected (Greene, 2008; Heckman, 1979). To address the poten-
tial bias, we conducted a two-stage Heckman correction procedure 
(Heckman, 1979). In Stage 1, a probit model predicting the likelihood 
of being included in the final sample (i.e., more than five TMT mem-
bers participated in the survey) was used with organizational age, or-
ganizational size, HPWS, trust, past performance, and industry and 
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year dummies as independent variables. Based on the result of the 
probit model, the inverse Mills ratio was calculated (Greene, 2008). 
This correction was included as a control variable in the second stage 
analysis (Heckman, 1979), but the inverse Mills ratio was not signifi-
cant. The analysis results showed no evidence of sample selection bias. 
Therefore, following Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009), and Pathak, 
Hoskisson, and Johnson (2014), we excluded the inverse Mills ratio 
from the following analysis models to preserve degrees of freedom. 
4   Results 
Descriptive statistics of our study variables and their intercorrelations 
are presented in Table I. Tables 2 and 3 show the hierarchical regres-
sion analysis results. 
Hypothesis 1 postulated that HPWSs negatively moderate the re-
lationship between VPD and organizational performance. As Tables 2 
and 3 show, the interaction between VPD and HPWS was negative and 
significant with respect to ROA (Model 4: b = –2.43, SE = .95, p < .05) 
and firm profitability (Model 10: b = –.17, SE = .09, p < .10). Following 
the suggestion by Aiken and West (1991), we plotted the interaction 
effect of HPWSs and VPD with one standard deviation above and be-
low the means of variables. As Figure 2(a) and Figure 3(a) show, the 
effect of VPD on organizational performance is positive for low HPWS 
but negative for high HPWS. We further examined the simple slopes 
of each plot (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006). The simple slopes tests 
showed that the effect of VPD for high HPWS was significant for ROA 
(b = –1.59, SE = .65, p < .05) and firm profitability (b = –.18, SE = .06, 
p < .01). The effect of VPD for low HPWS was significant for ROA (b 
= 3.27, SE = 1.33, p < .05) but not for firm profitability (b = .16, SE = 
0.13, ns). In general, Hypothesis 1 was supported. 
Hypothesis 2 proposed that skill-enhancing HPWS negatively 
moderates the relationship between VPD and organizational perfor-
mance. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, the interaction between VPD and 
skill-enhancing HPWSs was negative and significant with respect to 
ROA (Model 6: b = –17.39, SE = 4.82, p < .01) and firm profitability 
(Model 12: b = –1.19, SE = .48, p < .05). Following the same procedure, 
we plotted the interaction effect of VPD and skill-enhancing HPWS 
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on organizational performance in Figures 2 and 3. The plots consis-
tently indicate that the effect of VPD on firm performance is negative 
for high-skill-enhancing HPWS but positive for low-skill-enhancing 
HPWS. Simple slopes tests results supported our interpretation. The 
effect of VPD for high-skill-enhancing HPWS was negative and signif-
icant for ROA (b = –13.69, SE = 4.23, p < .01) and firm profitability (b 
= –1.02, SE = .42, p < .05). The effect of VPD for low-skill- enhancing 
HPWSs, however, was positive and significant in predicting ROA (b = 
21.09, SE = 5.47, p < .01) and firm profitability (b = 1.35, SE = .55, p < 
.05). Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported. 
Hypothesis 3 postulated that motivation-enhancing HPWS neg-
atively moderates the relationship between VPD and organizational 
performance. Tables 2 and 3 indicate that the interaction between VPD 
and motivation-enhancing HPWS was negative and significant in pre-
dicting ROA (Model 6: b = –18.15, SE = 4.37, p < .01) and firm profit-
ability (Model 12: b = –1.05, SE = .43, p < .05). The interactive effects 
of VPD and motivation-enhancing HPWS are presented in Figures 2 
and 3. Consistent with our expectation, the plots show that the effect 
of VPD on firm performance depends on the level of motivation-en-
hancing HPWS. Simple slopes tests show that the effect of VPD for 
high-motivation-enhancing HPWS was negative and significant with 
regard to ROA (b = –14.45, SE = 3.68, p < .01) and firm profitability (b 
= –.89, SE = .36, p < .05). Simple slopes tests also show that the ef-
fect of VPD for low-motivation-enhancing HPWSs was positive and 
significant with regard to ROA (b = 21.85, SE = 5.10, p < .01) and firm 
profitability (b = 1.22, SE = .50, p < .05). Hypothesis 3 was supported. 
Hypothesis 4 proposed that opportunity-enhancing HPWSs posi-
tively moderate the relationship between VPD and organizational per-
formance. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, the interaction between VPD 
and opportunity-enhancing HPWSs was positively significant in pre-
dicting ROA (Model 6: b = 15.86, SE = 4.37, p < .01) and firm profit-
ability (Model 12: b = .94, SE = .43, p < .05). Consistent with our ex-
pectation, the interactive effects of VPD and opportunity-enhancing 
HPWSs presented in Figures 2 and 3 indicate that the effect of VPD on 
firm performance is positive for high-opportunity-enhancing HPWSs 
but negative for low-opportunity-enhancing HPWSs. We further per-
formed simple slopes tests. The effect of VPD for high-opportunity-
enhancing HPWS was positive and significant with respect to ROA (b 
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= 19.56, SE = 5.05, p < .01) and firm profitability (b = 1.10, SE = 0.50, 
p < .05). However, the effect of VPD for low-opportunity-enhancing 
HPWS was negative and significant in predicting ROA (b = –12.16, SE 
= 3.76, p < .01) and firm profitability (b = –.78, SE = .37, p < .05). Thus, 
Hypothesis 4 was supported. We obtained similar results with work-
force productivity and net income as criterion variables.  
4.1   Robustness checks 
4.1.1   Quality of management 
While the analysis results provided consistent support for our hy-
potheses across various performance measures, they cannot com-
pletely rule out alternative explanations. Quality of management could 
be a critical alternative explanation for the relationships. High-qual-
ity management influences the designs of both HPWSs and VPD as 
well as firm performance. This raises an endogeneity concern for our 
findings. While controlling for past performance, which captures the 
nature of management quality, reduced some concern, we reran the 
analysis models with the measure of management quality controlled. 
Quality of management was measured by using the following four 
items (α = .73 in 2005; α = .71 in 2007; α = .74 in 2009; α = .74 in 
2011), which were rated by individual employees in each firm using a 
5-point Likert-type scale: the extent to which the firm retains talented 
employees, values talented employees, informs employees of firm’s 
situation in detail, and is being run by effective leadership. We aggre-
gated the individual-level measure to obtain the organizational-level 
management quality (ICC(1) = 0.19, ICC(2) = 0.90 in 2005; ICC(1) = 
0.18, ICC(2) = 0.88 in 2007; ICC(1) = 0.19, ICC(2) = 0.89 in 2009; ICC(1) 
= 0.20, ICC(2) = 0.90 in 2011). 
The analysis results with management quality controlled also sup-
ported our hypotheses. The interaction between VPD and HPWSs was 
significantly associated with ROA (b = –2.34, SE = .96, p < .05). The in-
teractions of VPD with skill-enhancing HPWSs (b = –17.27, SE = 4.82, 
p < .01), with motivation-enhancing HPWS (b = –18.07, SE = 4.38, p < 
.01), and with opportunity-enhancing HPWS (b = 15.84, SE = 4.38, p 
< .01) also significantly predicted ROA. Consistent results were found 
for firm profitability. 
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4.1.2   Incentive effect of VPD 
Essential to our theoretical argument is that VPD plays a role to in-
centivize employees. However, the differences in human capital among 
employees, specifically between workers and the management team, 
can increase VPD, and the proportion of VPD based on this legitimate 
reason may be less relevant to the incentive role. Thus, we reran the 
analysis models controlling for the variance of human capital within 
firm; the higher the variance of human capital, the higher VPD is. As 
educational level is one of the most widely used proxies for human 
capital, we used individual employees’ educational level to calculate 
the variance of employees’ educational level for each firm. The edu-
cational level of all the employees was provided by human resources 
managers in each firm. Controlling for the variance of human capital 
allowed us to more clearly examine the incentive effect of VPD. 
The results supported our hypotheses, as well. VPD–HPWS interac-
tion significantly predicted ROA (b = –2.42, SE = 0.95, p < 0.05). Simi-
larly, the interactions of VPD with skill-enhancing HPWSs (b = –17.24, 
SE = 4.84, p < .01), with motivation-enhancing HPWSs (b = –18.09, SE 
= 4.38, p < .01), and with opportunity-enhancing HPWS (b = 15.78, 
SE = 4.38, p < .01) were significantly associated with ROA. Consistent 
results were obtained with firm profitability. 
5   Discussion 
VPD and HPWSs offer competing logics for increasing performance 
through human resources. Results suggest that skill-enhancing and 
motivation-enhancing HPWS work to attenuate the efficacy of VPD, 
while opportunity-enhancing HPWSs strengthen the relationship be-
tween VPD and various firm performance metrics. As such, the study 
offers a number of useful insights for scholars and practitioners. First, 
the implications of tournament theory and vertical pay dispersion 
have been discussed at length in the economics and strategy liter-
atures, but have seldom been examined in concert with other man-
agement practices. Given that systems are often at work simultane-
ously, organizations seeking to optimize the efforts of their employees 
ought to carefully consider the implications of using both vertical pay 
structures and HPWSs to manage employees. 
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As opposed to a universalistic view of HPWS as nearly always be-
ing beneficial to organizational success (Pfeffer, 1998), the present 
study supports a configurational approach (Lepak & Snell, 1999, 2002) 
in which practices need to be considered as they relate to one an-
other prior to implementation. If practices compete with one another 
in terms of their motivational properties, then they might not be use-
fully configured within the same system. This study highlights the fact 
that the link between vertical pay structures and performance is sig-
nificantly weaker when skill- and motivation-enhancing high-perfor-
mance work practices are leveraged. This is not necessarily because 
these practices always compete, but may simply reflect the reality 
that employee skill and ability may be maximized by less expensive 
channels than those generally thought to accompany an HPWS. Of-
fering disproportionately increasing monetary rewards may provide 
enough incentive to attract and retain high-quality workers, without 
the need to invest in additional practices. Additional analysis is nec-
essary to continue to assess this possibility. 
Second, this article offers a nuanced perspective of the relation-
ship between HPWSs and VPD by decomposing the HPWS into skill-, 
motivation-, and opportunity-enhancing elements. This was demon-
strated to be an important test as the three subbundles were found 
to relate differently to VPD. While skill- and motivation-enhancing 
HPWSs diminished the effectiveness of VPD in firm performance, the 
opportunity-enhancing HPWS seems to increase the effectiveness of 
VPD. This was hypothesized and relates to the nature of opportunity-
enhancing HPWS. Those employees who choose to join organizations 
with steep hierarchies are hungry for the opportunity to prove their 
worth, particularly in relationship to others competing for similar pro-
motions. As such, providing employees with participation mechanisms 
and other opportunity-enhancing practices fits well with the aims of 
the vertically deployed pay structure. High-potential employees join 
the firm in the hope of gaining high levels of rewards and further ben-
efit from having the opportunity to perform. Under such situations, 
firms are more likely to optimize the use of human capital. 
Third, this article is able to leverage a multiyear data source to test 
the relationships longitudinally. While causation is not inferred, this 
model helps to limit reverse causality and allows for the chronological 
spacing of the independent and dependent variables. This represents 
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an important contribution to the strategic HRM literature, which has 
more frequently relied on cross-sectional designs rather than panel-
data models. 
Taking the findings of the study together offers a number of use-
ful avenues for continued investigation. First, one potential avenue for 
integrating VPD and HPWSs is via workforce differentiation. As ad-
vocated by Huselid and Becker (2010), workforce differentiation sug-
gests that organizations may be served well to offer different models 
of workforce management to different groups of employees within 
the firm. Those that are more strategically important assets ought to 
be managed differently than those with less strategic significance to 
the firm. Lepak, Taylor, Tekleab, Marrone, and Cohen (2007) found 
support for this idea in demonstrating that firms tend to utilize high-
involvement HR systems to a greater extent for “core” employees. 
Building on these ideas, it would be worthwhile to investigate the 
utilization of HPWs at higher levels of the organization and leverag-
ing VPD for lower-level positions. Of course, this introduces a num-
ber of integration challenges, but provides an interesting avenue for 
future investigation. 
Future work may also examine the connections of VPD and HPWSs 
given different levels of task interdependency, a known moderator of 
the relationship between horizontal pay dispersion and performance 
outcomes (Shaw et al., 2002). It may be that VPD is particularly pow-
erful in highly autonomous work, which marginalizes the effective-
ness of HPWSs. However, under situations of greater task interdepen-
dence, it may be that VPD and HPWSs work more closely together or 
via similar channels. Future research ought to assess the joint effects 
of HPWSs and VPD in task-interdependent environments to deter-
mine the nature of the relationship between the two constructs when 
teamwork is necessitated. 
Though tangential, this study further adds to the literature exam-
ining the effects of compensation on performance outcomes. The re-
sults of this study highlight the important motivational role that VPD 
plays in producing performance outcomes. This supports the tradi-
tional sorting and incentive effects espoused by tournament theory 
(Lazear & Rosen, 1981). However, this study does not examine other 
unintended consequences of such practices like competition within 
the firm, a lack of teamwork, or higher levels of turnover (Akerlof & 
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Yellen, 1988; Ferraro et al., 2005; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993). Future work 
is necessary to determine if more egalitarian pay structures fit more 
closely with HPWSs. 
5.1   Practical Implications 
The theoretical and empirical relationships discussed above have im-
portant practical implications for HR professionals. Most notably, the 
paper continues to highlight the importance of viewing HR practices 
from a systems approach. Understanding the ways in which compen-
sation practices interface with the rest of the HR system is an impor-
tant key to building effective systems. The study demonstrates the 
importance of not working against purposes with the system itself to 
ensure that the HR practices in place complement one another rather 
than detract from one another. HR professionals are well served to 
focus on intended outcomes and then devise a constellation of prac-
tices to achieve the desired outcomes. This stands in contrast to a best 
practices model that assumes “more is better.” Considering the hori-
zontal linkages is key to both minimizing costs and ensuring a return 
from investments in the HR architecture. 
In particular, firms appear to be well positioned when they pair 
compensation practices that enhance motivation and sort high-qual-
ity candidates into the firm with opportunity-enhancing practices that 
allow those individuals to showcase their talents. The firm may be 
able to limit costs in other areas by offering competitive wage struc-
tures, but should be mindful of maximizing opportunity enhance-
ment within the firm. At the same time firms that leverage high levels 
of HPWS in seeking collaboration and commitment from employees 
will likely be served by more egalitarian pay structures and flatter or-
ganizational structures. 
The key takeaway message for practitioners is to understand the 
desired outcomes of the HR system and tailor the system toward 
those outcomes. A consultancy that relies significantly on the efforts 
of individual employees may receive optimal results from a hierarchi-
cal pay structure that minimizes other HR systems. Such a firm will 
likely be able to sort in high-quality applicants with less cost, incentiv-
ize performance through promotion and pay increases, and sort out 
poor performers who do not advance in the corporate tournaments, 
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without having to invest in costly training, development, and perfor-
mance improvement practices. Such is the case in many consulting, 
accounting, and law firms that rely on “up or out” partnership-based 
business models. 
Conversely, a firm that seeks to build a pool of committed human 
resources that work collaboratively will likely be served best by offer-
ing a less hierarchical pay structure that emphasizes training and ca-
reer development alongside participation, information sharing, and 
more group or team-based pay practices, to ensure the firm’s human 
capital remains knowledgeable and motivated to produce. Compa-
nies such as Whole Foods (Harasta & Hoffman, 2013), which deem-
phasize power distance and strive for fewer levels of hierarchy, are 
likely better served by a full HPWS, rather than a reliance on a hier-
archical pay structure. 
The results may also have implications for smaller firms. While such 
companies are likely to lack the resources to invest heavily in a full 
system of HR practices, they may be able to achieve similar benefits 
from a vertically dispersed pay structure. Such structures may be built 
on incentives or other forms of “at risk” compensation, as to minimize 
the risk held by the organization. If such systems are able to sort and 
incentivize quality human capital, the results may be more econom-
ically efficient for smaller firms. Of course, additional analysis is nec-
essary prior to implementing such practices. 
5.2   Limitations 
The results of the study should be considered in light of its limita-
tions. First, the study utilizes a large archival data source, which limits 
the ability to understand the microdynamics of the motivational ele-
ments of both VPD and HPWS. Such factors are inferred from exist-
ing theory, but are not measured directly. Similar to motivation, atti-
tudinal variables such as organizational commitment (Meyer & Allen, 
1991) and perceived organizational support (Eisenberger, Huntington, 
Hutchison, & Sowa, 1986) may also be influenced by VPD and HPWS. 
Though this is a common limitation in the field of strategic human 
resource management, future research should directly examine how 
a simultaneous utilization of VPD and HPWS influences employees’ 
work motivation and work attitudes, which, in turn, contribute to firm 
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performance. Further, many of the reported measures are subjectively 
assessed, particularly the measures for HPWS. Many firms experience 
significant differences in perceptions of the practices they claim and 
those they actually implement (Liao, Toya, Lepak, & Hong, 2009). It 
was not possible for us to measure the actual versus the intended use 
of such practices, which limits the conclusions that can be drawn from 
the study. Further related to the measurement of total employment 
value under efficiency wage theory, based on the broader HPWS lit-
erature, we use payroll as a proxy for efficiency wage. Efficiency wage 
requires separation of total employment value from total compensa-
tion. While in the strategic HRM literature it is common to use em-
ployees’ annual salary as a proxy for efficiency wage, such measure-
ments remain a limitation of this study. 
We acknowledge that the generalizability of the findings may be 
limited to South Korea, a culture that is considerably different from 
the United States. While the United States is an individualistic culture, 
South Korea is a collectivistic culture. In an individualistic culture, per-
sonal interests are of the most importance, but in a collectivistic cul-
ture, the cooperation among individuals is emphasized, and group 
interests take precedence over individual interests or needs (Wagner, 
1995). This unique context may enlarge the detrimental effect of VPD 
when it is utilized with HPWSs because VPD encourages competition 
among employees. Future research could endeavor to address the 
generalizability of our findings. In addition, while several control vari-
ables were included in the regressions, including controls for past per-
formance, there still could be the possibility of omitted variable bias. 
When a variable that influences both predictors and the dependent 
variable is excluded from an analysis model, omitted variable bias oc-
curs (Greene, 2008). We could not capture varying firm and employee 
characteristics; however, estimates in a panel setting account for un-
observed firm heterogeneity, and thus allows for more consistent and 
reliable estimation. 
5.3   Conclusion 
While vertical pay dispersion and high-performance work systems 
each offer motivational benefits to organizations, the underlying 
mechanisms between such systems operate differently. As such, 
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careful attention needs to be given to creating harmony between the 
compensation practices of the firm and the constellation of other HRM 
practices leveraged. The results from this study suggest that including 
VPD and HPWSs simultaneously may lead to suboptimal outcomes, 
particularly in regard to skill- and motivation-enhancing HPWSs. At 
the same time, creating opportunities via the firm’s HR system ap-
pears to complement the principles of VPD to enhance performance. 
Messersmith  et  al .  in  Human Resources  Management ,  2017       31
Figure 1. Contrasting VPD and HPWS  
Figure 2. Interactive effect of vertical pay dispersion (VPD) and high-performance 
work systems (HPWSs) on ROA  
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Figure 3. Interactive effect of vertical pay dispersion (VPD) and high-performance work systems (HPWS) on firm profitability        
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Variable  M  SD  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
1. Organizational age  29.79  19.00  — 
2. Organizational size  2.90  0.51  0.21**  — 
3. Educational level of firm employees  2.26  0.56  –0.13*  –0.12  — 
4. Analyzer  0.36  0.48  0.01  –0.12  0.01  — 
5. Prospector  0.40  0.49  0.11  0.25**  0.04  –0.61**  — 
6. Vertical pay dispersion  0.00  1.00  –0.01  –0.01  0.02  –0.05  –0.06  — 
7. HPWS  0.00  1.00  0.05  0.42**  0.04  –0.14*  0.26**  0.02  — 
8. Return on assets  7.36  4.87  –0.14*  0.08  0.03  –0.13  0.05  –0.06  –0.02  — 
9. Firm profitability  4.35  0.59  0.19**  0.22**  –0.15*  –0.06  0.13*  –0.16*  0.26**  0.45** 
N = 233. HPWS = high-performance work system; SD = standard deviation. 
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01
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Table 2. Hierarchical regression results: interactive effect of vertical pay dispersion and HPWS on ROA 
                                                                                Dependent Variable: ROA (T + 1) 
Predictors   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
  b.(SE)  b.(SE)  b.(SE)  b.(SE)  b.(SE)  b.(SE) 
Intercept   0.46 (3.86)  0.46 (3.87)  0.55 (3.88)  0.54 (3.83)  0.02 (3.88)  0.28 (3.71) 
Control variables 
Organizational age   –0.03 (0.02)  –0.03 (0.02)  –0.03 (0.02)  –0.03 (0.02)  –0.03 (0.02)  –0.03 (0.02) 
Organizational size   0.45 (0.64)  0.46 (0.64)  0.59 (0.71)  0.47 (0.70)  0.28 (0.74)  0.21 (0.70) 
Educational level of firm employees   –0.94 (0.83)  –0.95 (0.84)  –0.92 (0.84)  –0.98 (0.83)  –1.06 (0.84)  –0.90 (0.81) 
Analyzer   –0.20 (0.71)  –0.22 (0.72)  –0.22 (0.72)  –0.28 (0.71)  –0.16 (0.72)  0.18 (0.69) 
Prospector   0.41 (0.74)  0.39 (0.75)  0.40 (0.75)  0.47 (0.74)  0.32 (0.75)  0.66 (0.73) 
Past firm performancea   0.55 (0.05)**  0.55 (0.05)**  0.55 (0.05)**  0.55 (0.05)**  0.56 (0.06)**  0.55 (0.05)** 
Independent variables 
Vertical pay dispersion (VPD)    –0.06 (0.26)  –0.06 (0.26)  0.84 (0.44)†  –0.05 (0.26)  3.70 (0.82)** 
HPWS     –0.15 (0.33)  –0.24 (0.33) 
VPD × HPWS  [H1]     –2.43 (0.95)* 
Skill-enhancing HPWS       –0.31 (0.29)  –1.55 (0.46)** 
Motivation-enhancing HPWS       0.34 (0.33)  –0.86 (0.44)† 
Opportunity-enhancing HPWS       –0.36 (0.31)  0.75 (0.42)† 
VPD × Skill-enhancing HPWS  [H2]       –17.39 (4.82)** 
VPD × Motivation-enhancing HPWS  [H3]       –18.15 (4.37)** 
VPD × Opportunity-enhancing HPWS  [H4]       15.86 (4.37)** 
Industry and year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
F value 5.56**   5.39**  5.24**  5.41**  5.09**  5.77** 
R2 / Adjusted R2   0.52 / 0.43  0.52 / 0.42  0.52 / 0.42  0.54 / 0.44  0.53 / 0.43  0.58 / 0.48 
N = 233
HPWS = high-performance work system
† p < .10 ; * p < .05 ; **p < .01 
a. ROA measured at T was included.  
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Notes 
1. We would like to thank the observations of an anonymous reviewer for bring-
ing this attribute to our attention. 
2. More details on sampling frame and survey procedures are available at http://
eng.krivet.re.kr/eu/eh/prg_euGBADs.jsp 
Table 3. Hierarchical regression results: Interactive effect of vertical pay dispersion and HPWS on firm profitability 
                                                                                    Dependent Variable: Firm profitability (T + 1) 
Predictors   Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10  Model 11  Model 12 
  b.(SE)  b.(SE)  b.(SE)  b.(SE)  b.(SE)  b.(SE) 
Intercept   1.45 (0.47)**  1.49 (0.46)**  1.47 (0.46)**  1.41 (0.46)**  1.44 (0.47)**  1.38 (0.46)** 
Control variables 
Organizational age   –0.00 (0.00)  –0.00 (0.00)  –0.00 (0.00)  –0.00 (0.00)  –0.00 (0.00)  –0.00 (0.00) 
Organizational size   –0.01 (0.06)  –0.01 (0.06) 0.02 (0.07)  0.01 (0.07)  0.01 (0.07)  0.00 (0.07) 
Educational level of firm employees   0.07 (0.08)  0.06 (0.08)  0.06 (0.08)  0.06 (0.08)  0.06 (0.08)  0.06 (0.08) 
Analyzer   0.00 (0.07)  –0.02 (0.07)  –0.02 (0.07)  –0.03 (0.07)  –0.02 (0.07)  –0.00 (0.07) 
Prospector   0.07 (0.07)  0.04 (0.07)  0.05 (0.07)  0.05 (0.07)  0.05 (0.07)  0.06 (0.07) 
Past firm performancea   0.69 (0.06)**  0.68 (0.05)**  0.69 (0.06)**  0.70 (0.06)**  0.69 (0.06)**  0.71 (0.06)** 
Independent variables 
Vertical pay dispersion (VPD)    –0.07 (0.03)**  –0.07 (0.02)**  –0.01 (0.04)  –0.07 (0.03)**  0.16 (0.08)* 
HPWS     –0.04 (0.03)  –0.04 (0.03) 
VPD × HPWS  [H1]     –0.17 (0.09)† 
Skill-enhancing HPWS       –0.03 (0.03)  –0.11 (0.05)* 
Motivation-enhancing HPWS       –0.01 (0.03)  –0.07 (0.04)† 
Opportunity-enhancing HPWS       –0.03 (0.03)  0.03 (0.04) 
VPD × Skill-enhancing HPWS  [H2]       –1.19 (0.48)* 
VPD × Motivation-enhancing HPWS  [H3]       –1.05 (0.43)* 
VPD × Opportunity-enhancing HPWS  [H4]       0.94 (0.43)* 
Industry and year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
F value   11.49**  11.83**  11.58**  11.51**  10.96**  10.80** 
R2 / Adjusted R2   0.69 / 0.63  0.71 / 0.65  0.71 / 0.65  0.71 / 0.65  0.71 / 0.64  0.72 / 0.66  
N = 233
HPWS = high-performance work system 
† p < .10 ; * p < .05 ; ** p < .01 
a. Firm profitability measured at T was included.
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